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Statutory Récognition Provisions 
in Britain, 1976-80 
P.B. Beaumont 
This paper assesses the extent to which the union movement 
in Great Britain was able to realise in practice thepotential advan-
tages of the statutory récognition provisions. 
In Britain there has long been policy pronouncements favouring the en-
couragement of union organisation and collective bargaining arrangements. 
For example, Britain has ratified ILO Convention No. 98 which obliges 
governments «to encourage and promote the full development and utilisa-
tion of machinery for voluntary negotiation between employers or 
employers organisations and workers organisations, with a view to the 
régulation of terms and conditions of employment by means of collective 
agreements». However, despite such statements there was no gênerai, légal 
support for union récognition in Britain prior to the 1970s. Admittedly 
Government administrative, as opposed to législative, activity was an im-
portant stimulus to union growth, particularly during the two war periods1. 
However, by the mid-1960s this type of assistance and support was seen by 
certain trade unions, most notably those seeking to organise white collar 
workers, to be an increasingly inadéquate substitute for statutory récogni-
tion provisions. The extent of such union concern about the absence of 
statutory récognition provisions had reached such a stage by the mid-1960s 
that the following motion was passed at the annual meeting of the Trades 
Union Congress in 1966: 
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This Congress ... calls upon the Labour Government to give effect to the ratification 
of ILO Convention 98 by législative action. Such législation should contain provi-
sions which establish the right of workpeople, through their trade unions, to collec-
tive bargaining rights and place on the employers an obligation to concède ail the 
rights of représentation which emanate from union membership.2 
Thèse sorts of demands for statutory union récognition provisions, 
which were put forward by a number of académies as well as by various 
unions in their évidence to the Donovan Commission (1965-68),3 were even-
tually met by provisions of the Indusîrial Relations Act 1971. Thèse provi-
sions were, however, little utilised in practice due to the unions' gênerai 
'boycott' of this Act; the workload of the relevant third party, décision 
making body (i.e. the Commission on Industrial Relations), which had been 
involved in récognition claims on a non-statutory basis from 1969 to 1971, 
was relatively light, involving less than 50 claims in a four-year period4. As a 
resuit of this limited usage the récognition issue did not figure prominently 
in the debate over the repeal of the 1971 Act. Nevertheless a number of 
potentially useful operational lessons appeared to émerge from this par-
ticular expérience. Thèse lessons included the factors held to be relevant in 
the détermination of the appropriate 'bargaining agent' and 'bargaining 
unit',5 and the operational difficulties of trying to ensure employer com-
pliance with third party recommendations for récognition in the présence of 
relatively weak sanctions6. 
The second expérience with statutory récognition provisions in Britain 
came during the years 1976-80 when Sections 11-16 of the Employment Pro-
tection Act 1975 were in opération7. Thèse provisions resulted from the 
Labour Government coming into office in February 1974 on the basis of an 
explicit agreement with the unions. This agreement, or 'social contract', in-
volved the TUC commiting the union movement to wage restraint in return 
for certain législative and économie gains; among the législative gains were 
thèse récognition provisions8. Thèse statutory récognition provisions were 
2 Annual Report of the Trades Union Congress, 1966, pp. 389-90. 
3 See, for example, Allan FLANDERS, Collective Bargaining: Prescription for 
Change, Faber and Faber, London, 1967, pp. 39-45. 
4 Bernard JAMES, «Third Party Intervention in Récognition Disputes: The Rôle of the 
Commission on Industrial Relations», Industrial Relations Journal, Vol. 8, No. 2, 1977. 
5 CIR Study No. 5, Trade Union Récognition: The CIR Expérience, HMSO, London, 
1974. 
6 JAMES, Loc. cit. 
7 For an outline of thèse provisions see S. KESSLER and G. PALMER, «Reconsidering 
Récognition», Personnel Management, July 1975. 
8 See A.W.J. THOMSON, «Trade Unions and the Corporate State in Britain», In-
dustrial and Labor Relations Review, Vol. 33, No. 1, October 1979, pp. 39-41. 
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utilised far more extensively than those of the 1971 Act. Moreover, they 
provided the relevant third party, décision making body (i.e. the Advisory 
Conciliation and Arbitration Service), with probably the most controversial 
and troublesome aspect of its overall workload. The difficulties of satisfac-
torily operating thèse provisions derived from a variety of problems, most 
notably, inter-union rivalry for récognition, employer opposition to such 
récognition and a number of 'restrictive' court rulings on the criteria the 
Advisory Conciliation and Arbitration Service (henceforth refenred to as 
ACAS) was to apply in récognition claims9. For example, following the 
much publicised Grunwick case, where the House of Lords ruled that 
ACAS had a duty to ascertain the opinions of ail groups of workers likely to 
be affected by the récognition claim, the extent of employer non-co-
operation with ACAS increased through time; the ACAS Annual Report 
for 1980 indicated that such non-co-operation only occurred in nine of the 
first 150 claims, but by the time the provisions were repealed (August 1980) 
such difficulties were being experienced in over 50 of the 248 outstanding 
cases10. Thèse difficulties had in fact reached such a stage by mid 1979 that 
the Chairman of ACAS drew attention to them in a letter to the Secretary of 
State for Employment11. Following this letter the Government issued a 
working paper in September 1979 which stated that «... the expérience of 
operating thèse statutory procédures does raise the question whether it is 
necessary or valuable to hâve statutory provisions of this kind to deal with 
thèse matters ...»12. And subsequently, the Employment Act 1980 repealed 
Sections 11-16 of the Employment Protection Act 1975. The resuit is that 
statutory récognition provisions do not currently exist in Britain. 
The purpose of this paper is not to review the whole range of 
behavioural and légal issues raised by the opération of statutory récognition 
provisions in Britain during the period 1976-80,13 but rather to assess the ex-
tent to which the union movement was able to realise in practice the poten-
tial advantages of thèse statutory récognition provisions. In order to under-
take such an exercise, we must first specify the conditions that must be 
fulfilled by a union movement seeking to realise the potential advantages of 
such provisions. The relevant conditions, which are developed in the next 
section by référence to the notion of union organising costs, are the incen-
9 For a gênerai summary of thèse difficulties see H.A. CLEGG, The Changing System 
of Industrial Relations in Great Britain, Basil Blackwell, Oxford, 1979, pp. 408-21. 
10 ACAS Annual Report 1980, HMSO, London, 1981, pp. 76-77. 
n This letter is reproduced in the ACAS Annual Report, 1979, HMSO, London 1980, 
pp. 108-12. 
12 See Department of Employment Gazette, September 1979, p. 874. 
13 For such a review see P.B. BEAUMONT, Trade Union Récognition: The British Ex-
périence 1976-80, Employée Relations Monograph, MCB 1981. 
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tive that certain unions had to push for the introduction of such provisions; 
the ability to introduce them was provided, as indicated earlier, by the ex-
istence of the 'Social Contract'. In making this point it should be emphasis-
ed that not ail unions were particularly interested in the establishment of 
statutory récognition provisions. They were, for example, of relatively little 
interest to many of the well established manual unions in highly organised 
industries, such as coal, steel and the railways. The leading advocates were 
very largely the unions seeking to organise the white collar grades of labour 
in relatively expanding industries such as insurance, banking and financial 
services. 
UNION ORGANISING COSTS AND STATUTORY 
RECOGNITION PROVISIONS 
The most useful way of introducing and developing the notion of union 
organising costs is to consider a number of changing characteristics of the 
British System of industrial relations that raised questions about the ade-
quacy of the traditional, voluntary methods of trying to achieve union 
récognition, and consequently suggested the potential value of having 
statutory récognition provisions. The first such feature was the changing 
nature of bargaining structure that was increasingly apparent in Britain 
from the 1960s. This period of time witnessed a continuing, strong move-
ment away from a System of predominantly multi-employer, industry level 
collective bargaining to one of single employer bargaining conducted at the 
plant, and to a lesser extent the company, level14. And the potential impor-
tance of formai, statutory provisions to deal with 'substantial récognition 
problems' is very much enhanced in a System characterised by single 
employer bargaining arrangements,15 simply because of the inevitably 
greater volume, and more complex nature, of récognition issues in such a 
System. The second relevant factor was the relatively high overall level of 
work-force organisation that had corne about in Britain by the early 1970s. 
The position was that by the early 1970s some 50 per cent of the total 
workforce (64.7 per cent of the manual workforce) were unionised, while 
some 72 per cent of the total workforce (83.2 per cent of the manual 
workforce) were employed under the terms and conditions laid down in col-
14 The most comprehensive évidence is présentée! and analysed in D.R. DEATON and 
P.B. BEAUMONT, «The Déterminants of Bargaining Structure: Some Large Scale Survey 
Evidence for Britain», British Journal of Industrial Relations, Vol. XVIII, No. 2, July 1980. 
15 On this point see Alan GLADSTONE and Muneto OZAKI, «Trade Union Récogni-
tion for Collective Bargaining Purposes», International Labour Review, Vol. CXII, August-
September 1975, pp. 165-67. 
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lective agreements16. Thèse relatively high base figures suggested that the 
union movement might well face substantial difficulties and costs in attemp-
ting to increase the proportion of the workforce that was organised in the 
near future, particularly if reliance was placed solely on the traditional, 
voluntary methods of attempting to achieve récognition. In other words, 
the unions had to consider the possibility that something of a saturation 
point in the extent of overall workforce organisation17 might be uncomfor-
tably close to hand. 
The third and final background considération was the fact that both 
the industrial and occupational distribution of employment was continuing 
to move strongly against the traditionally highly organised sectors of 
employment. And as a resuit the overall level of workforce organisation 
would be difficult to maintain, much less increase, in the near future. In this 
regard Price and Bain,18 for example, estimated that if the industrial 
distribution of employment had not changed between 1948 and 1974 union 
membership and density would hâve been greater by about 8 per cent. This 
adverse, industrial distribution effect was compounded by the strong shift 
of employment towards the relatively unorganised white collar section of 
the workforce. Indeed this occupational trend was of such magnitude that 
Price and Bain predicted that overall union density would fall below 50 per 
cent by the end of the décade if the existing levels of white collar and 
manual worker unionisation were simply maintained and not increased19. 
In the face of such adverse industrial and occupational distribution of 
employment trends the availability of statutory récognition provisions is 
likely to become of major potential importance to any union movement. 
This is because the union movement is no longer in the position of being 
able to enjoy substantial membership gains through the simple mechanism 
of employment increases in the traditionally well organised sectors of the 
labour market, which hâve such extensive closed shop arrangements. In 
such circumstances the potential importance of statutory récognition provi-
sions to any union movement is that they can arguably assist unions to make 
inroads into the relatively little organised sectors of the labour market. This 
16 Thèse figures are taken from P.B. BEAUMONT and M.B. GREGORY, «The Rôle of 
Employers in Collective Bargaining in Britain», Industrial Relations Journal, Vol. 11, No. 5, 
November/December 1980. 
17 Julius REZLER, Union Growth Reconsidérée!: A Critical Analysis of Récent Growth 
Théories, Kossuth Foundation, New York, 1961, p. 4. 
18 R.J. PRICE and G.S. BAIN, «Union Growth Revisited: 1948-74 in Perspective», 
British Journal of Industrial Relations, Vol. XIV, No. 3, November 1976, pp. 341-44. 
19 PRICE and BAIN, op. cit., p. 347. For some preliminary évidence on this prédiction, 
see New Society, 26 June 1980, p. 358. 
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assistance would largely corne about on the supply side of the market 
through a réduction in union organising costs, which are likely to be a func-
tion of (i) workforce characteristics (e.g. sex, occupation); (ii) establishment 
characteristics (e.g. plant size); and (iii) the existence and extent of employer 
opposition to the organisation of their workforce. There has in fact been no 
explicit, detailed theoretical or empirical treatment of the extent and nature 
of union organising costs. However, such cost considérations are invariably 
drawn upon to justify the inclusion of certain variables in multivariate 
studies of inter-industry, inter-area etc., variation in the level of workforce 
organisation20. More generally, a number of contributors to the 'satura-
tionist versus historical school' debate over the future growth prospects of 
the American labour movement hâve made extensive référence to the im-
portant rôle of union organising costs21. Indeed the saturationist position is 
essentially based on the notion of the inordinately high costs facing unions 
in their attempts to organise the currently under-organized sectors of the 
labour market. 
In summary, statutory récognition provisions can, at least in principle, 
help unions to penetrate the hard to organise sectors of the labour market. 
In Britain there are likely to be two quite dissimilar groups of hard to 
organise employers:22 (i) the industries with relatively low levels of white 
collar organisations; and (ii) the relatively few unorganised plants situated 
in industries with relatively high levels of manual worker organisation. 
Thèse are likely to be the two major target groups for unions using statutory 
récognition provisions. However, for the potential advantages or benefits 
of such provisions to be realised in practice there must be évidence that the 
following conditions hâve been met: 
(i) there is a significant concentration of récognition claims in thèse 
relatively hard to organise sectors of the labour market; 
(ii) there is a significant concentration of 'successful' (i.e. those which in-
volve a third party recommendation for récognition) claims in thèse 
relatively hard to organise sectors of the labour market; and 
(ii) there is a significant concentration of employer compliance with the 
third party recommendations for récognition in thèse relatively hard 
to organise sectors of the labour market. 
20 See, for example, Barry T. H I R S C H , «The Déterminants of Unionisat ion: An 
Analysis of Interarea Différences», Industrial and Labor Relations Review, Vol. 33, N o . 3, 
January 1980, p . 151. 
21 For an overview and testing of some of the hypothèses generated by this debate see 
William J. MOORE and Robert J. NEWMAN, «Déterminants of Différences in Union 
Membership Among the States», Proceedings of the Industrial Relations Research Associa-
tion, Winter 1973, pp. 188-96. 
22 For some trade union évidence on this matter see Annual Report ofthe Trades Union 
Congress, 1967, p. 130. 
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The explicit setting out of thèse three conditions clearly indicates both 
the opportunities and challenges that the availability of statutory récogni-
tion provisions poses for a union movement in a System of industrial rela-
tions characterised by the structural features discussed above. The point is 
that high organising cost considérations should lead unions to dispropor-
tionately concentrate their initial récognition claims in the relatively hard to 
organise sectors of the labour market, but thèse very same cost considéra-
tions are likely to militate against the union movement successfully fulfilling 
conditions (ii) and (iii) above. In other words, the présence of high organis-
ing costs, ceteris paribus, place unions seeking to organise such workers in a 
relatively weak position which will make the potential advantages of 
statutory provisions attractive to them, but at the same time particularly 
difficult to realise in practice. 
Accordingly, in the remainder of this paper we consider the extent to 
which the above three conditions were fulfilled in Britain during the period 
of opération of Sections 11-16 of the Employment Protection Act 1975 — 
i.e. the period 1976-80. 
AN OVERVIEW OF USAGE 
Under Section 11 of the Employment Protection Act 1975, an indepen-
dent trade union could refer a récognition issue to ACAS and when ACAS 
received such an application, it examined the issue and tried to settle it by 
conciliation. If a settlement could not be reached by agreement, ACAS 
made further inquiries which included finding out the views of the workers 
covered by the claim. Unless the référence was withdrawn, ACAS was re-
quired to prépare a written report setting out its findings, any recommenda-
tion for récognition and the reasons for making or not making a recommen-
dation — i.e. the Section 12 stage. A recommendation for récognition was 
not directly enforceable, but if the employer did not comply with it the 
union concerned could complain to ACAS under Section 15 of the Act. 
And, if ACAS was unable to settle the matter by conciliation, the union 
could seek a unilatéral award of terms and conditions of employment from 
the Central Arbitration Committee under Section 16 of the Act. 
In Table 1 we set out the total number of Section 11 récognition 
références which went to ACAS, the particular stage at which they settled 
and their outcome. The contents of Table 1 indicate that the overwhelming 
majority of récognition références were settled at the initial (Section 11) 
conciliation stage of the procédure. Indeed, only 247 références went 
through to a full, published report at the Section 12 stage of the procédure 
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out of the total number of 1,610 références. At the Section 11 stage just 
under half (47 per cent) of the 1,115 settlements resulted in the union being 
fully or partially successful in securing récognition. The union 'success rate' 
at the full statutory, Section 12 stage was greater, with approximately 65 per 
cent of the reports recommending full or partial récognition. The ACAS 
Annual Report for 198023 indicated that récognition had been accorded to 
about 65,000 workers as a direct outcome of ail Section 11 références, with 
some 49,000 of thèse employées receiving such coverage as a resuit of set-
tlements at the initial, Section 11, conciliation stage. Thèse figures can be 
put into some perspective by noting that the total coverage figure (i.e. 
65,000) only constituted 0.27 per cent of the total workforce (of approx-
imately 24,000,000) in the mid 1970s and only 0.35 per cent of the existing 
workforce then operating under the terms and conditions of collective 
agreements. 
TABLE 1 
Total Number of Références under Section 11, 
with their Stage of Seulement and Outcome 
(1 February 1976 — 15 August 1980) 
Stage Outcome Number 
Section 11 Full récognition accorded to union as a resuit of its application 306 
Partial récognition or representational rights accorded and accepted 
by union as satisfactory 143 
Section 11 application withdrawn for further negotiations between 
union and employer where union has been fully or partly successful in 
securing récognition 69 
Union claim to récognition withdrawn because of low membership 
and support 336 
Union claim withdrawn for other reasons 195 
Section 11 application withdrawn for further negotiations between 
union and employer where union has been unsuccessful in securing 
récognition 13 
Application for référence withdrawn for technical reasons 53 
Références where inquiries (conciliation, survey, etc.) were taking 
place prior to draft report 220 
Références where draft reports were under considération 28 
Références reported on under Section 12 247 
Total références 1,610 
Source: ACAS Annual Report 1980, Tables 17-19. 
23 ACAS Annual Report 1980, p. 99. 
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In the remainder of this paper there are three basic sets of évidence 
drawn upon in our attempt to assess the extent to which the union move-
ment in Britain met the three conditions set out earlier, and thus realised the 
potential advantages or gains of thèse statutory récognition provisions. The 
three sets of évidence are as follows: (i) an industry distribution of Section 
11 claims set out in the relevant annual reports of ACAS; (ii) the unit 
characteristics and ACAS recommendation in each claim that went to the 
full statutory stage of a Section 12 ballot and published report;24 and (iii) an 
independent follow-up by Incomes Data Services on the implementation (or 
not) of ACAS recommendations for récognition in the period of time 
following the issuance of a Section 12 report25. 
THE INDUSTRY LEVEL EVIDENCE 
In order to consider the fulfillment (or not) of our first basic condition 
for realising the potential advantages of statutory récognition provisions, 
we set out in Table 2 the relevant industry distribution (at the 2 digit in-
dustry level) for the initial Section 11 claims by individual year and for the 
period as a whole. 
The industries which stand out in Table 2, in terms of the proportion of 
claims accounted for by them, are clearly Food, drink and tobacco, 
Mechanical engineering, the Distributive trades, Professional and scientific 
services and Miscellaneous services; for the period as a whole thèse five in-
dustry orders accounted for just under 43 per cent of the total number of 
Section 11 références. Furthermore, we sought to assess the stability of in-
dustry rankings in the use of thèse procédures across this period of time by 
Computing Spearman (rank) corrélation coefficients. Thèse clearly revealed 
that the high (low) industry users of the Section 11 récognition procédures 
in one year were very much the high (low) industry users in the other years26. 
In order to explore the data in Table 2 further, we examined the nature 
and strength of the relationship between thèse figures and existing levels of 
workforce organisation. The statutory récognition provisions were seen 
from their inception as very much an instrument for white collar organisa-
24 Ail of thèse published reports were made available by the A C A S régional office in 
Scotland. The relevant data was extracted, coded and processed at Glasgow University. 
25 Their follow-up findings are set out in IDS Brief No . 114, August 1977; 125, January 
1978; 132 May 1978; 135 June 1978; 138 August 1978; 148 January 1979; and 188 September 
1980. 
26 The Spearman corrélation coefficients, which were ail statistically significant, ranged 
from 0.523 to 0.888. 
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TABLE 2 
Références under Section 11 Analysed by 
Industry Group in which Employer was Engaged 
Industry Group 1976 1977 1978 1979 1980 1976-80 
% % % % % % 
Agriculture, forestry and fishing 0.6 0.3 — 0.4 — 0.4 
Mining and quarrying 0.2 0.3 
— — — 
0.2 
Food, drink and tobacco 6.7 8.3 5.0 6.6 4.3 6.9 
Coal and petroleum products 0.9 0.5 2.2 0.4 
— 
0.9 
Chemicals and allied industries 5.8 5.7 7.2 6.2 5.7 6.1 
Métal manufacture 2.6 1.2 0.7 0.9 1.4 1.5 
Mechanical engineering 7.6 10.9 13.2 9.2 1.4 9.7 
Instrument engineering 1.5 3.6 5.4 1.7 
— 
2.9 
Electrical engineering 7.2 5.4 3.9 7.0 11.4 6.1 
Shipbuilding and marine engineering 3.9 1.6 0.7 0.4 1.4 1.9 
Vehicles 2.8 3.8 0.7 7.4 1.4 3.4 
Métal goods not elsewhere specified 4.0 1.6 0.4 2.6 
— 
2.1 
Textiles 2.4 2.8 2.9 2.2 
— 
2.5 
Leather, leather goods and fur 0.2 0.5 
— — — 
0.2 
Clothing and footwear 3.5 3.5 1.8 2.6 2.8 3.0 
Bricks, pottery, glass, cernent etc. 0.9 2.0 3.6 2.2 4.3 2.1 
Timber, furniture etc. 3.0 1.6 1.4 3.0 7.1 2.4 
Paper, printing and publishing 3.5 4.5 4.3 0.4 1.4 3.5 
Other manufacturing industries 5.6 2.9 2.9 5.3 4.3 4.1 
Construction 2.2 3.8 3.9 4.8 
— 
3.4 
Gas, electricity and water 0.2 0.2 
— — — 
0.1 
Transport and communication 5.0 4.3 2.2 3.0 8.6 4.2 
Distributive trades 9.8 8.2 12.5 8.8 4.3 9.3 
Insurance, banking and business services 7.8 5.0 5.0 2.6 4.3 5.4 
Professional and scientific services 3.7 5.9 7.2 8.3 22.9 6.6 
Miscellaneous services 8.0 10.0 10.4 13.6 13.0 10.2 
Public administration and defence 0.4 1.6 2.5 0.4 
— 
1.2 
Source: ACAS Annual Report 1980 
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tion, but in practice far from ail récognition claims were for white collar 
workers only; in 1979, for example, only a little over half (118) of the 227 
Section 11 références were for white collar workers only27. Accordingly, we 
extracted data from the 1973 New Earnings Survey on the proportion of 
both maie manual and non-manual employées working in each industry 
under the terms and conditions laid down by collective agreements28. We 
then entered thèse two agreement coverage variables in separate régression 
équations, together with the proportion of total employment accounted for 
by each industry. The latter is an essential control variable as our dépendent 
variable (i.e. column 6, Table 2) is in the form of the proportion of the total 
number of cases accounted for by each industry, which does not weight for 
the fact that large sized industries are likely to significantly influence the in-
dustry distributions in Table 2 simply because of their above average ab-
solute number of unorganised relationships. The two coverage variables 
had to be entered in separate régression équations because of the predic-
tably high degree of multi-collinearity between them (r = 0.65). The results 
of this estimation exercise (with t statistics in parenthèses) were as follows: 
ID(1) = 4.270 CONST - 0.052 NMCAC + 0.553 EMPLOY 
(2.1) (2.9) (5.0) 
(R2 = 0.54; F = 14.06; N= 27) 
ID(1) = 5.595 CONST - 0.046 MCAC + 0.458 EMPLOY 
(2.5) (1.7) (3.9) 
(R2 = 0.45; F = 9.71; N = 27) 
The control variable, employment size, is predictably highly significant in 
both équations, but the interesting resuit from a behavioural point of view 
is that for non-manual collective agreement coverage. This has the expected 
négative sign and is statistically significant, thus indicating that the unions 
disproportionately concentrated their organising efforts in the industries 
with relatively low levels of white collar organisation. The variable for 
manual worker collective agreement coverage is also negatively signed, but 
falls short of statistical significance. The indication is that the manual 
worker only claims were more randomly distributed across industries29. 
In summary, thèse findings would seem to suggest that the unions very 
largely fulfilled condition (i) of the three conditions that the unions must 
27 ACASAnnual Report 1979, p. 22. 
28 New Earnings Survey, 1973, H M S O L o n d o n , 1973, Tab le 110. 
29 There was little différence in the results when the relevant female coverage figures 
were substituted for their maie counterpar ts . This lack of change was hardly surprising as there 
was predictably a close relationship between maie and female non-manual coverage (r = 0.84) 
and between maie and female manual coverage (r = 0.70). 
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meet in order to realise the potential advantages of statutory récognition 
provisions. This is clearly an important step in the right direction from their 
point of view, but as we indicated in the previous section, it is conditions (ii) 
and (iii) that are likely to be the hardest to meet. Whether thèse conditions 
were successfully fulfilled is a matter that will be examined in the next sec-
tions of the paper. 
THE DETERMINANTS OF A RECOMMENDATION FOR RECOGNITION 
In this section we concentrate solely on the full statutory stage of the 
procédure where a récognition issue was not settled by conciliation or 
withdrawn and ACAS was required to issue a formai report under Section 
12 of the Act. In undertaking this analysis it is important to recall that only 
a relatively small proportion of récognition claims went through to this full 
staturoty stage (see Table 1); thèse 'hard to seule' claims are obviously con-
centrated at the heart of the hard to organise employer group(s). The impor-
tance of our subséquent analysis, therefore, follows not from the number of 
claims that are involved, but rather from the fact that the public policy con-
troversy surrounding thèse provisions was almost entirely centred on the 
Section 12 stage of the procédure. In concentrating on this particular sub-
set of claims, one should not, however, lose sight of the union gains at the 
Section 11, conciliation stage (see Table 1); gains that arguably would not 
hâve been realised in the absence of Section 12 as a 'back-up' stage. 
The Section 12 reports examined hère are based on the questionnaires 
or ballots that ACAS used to 'ascertain the opinions of workers to whom 
the issue relates' by enquiring about their union membership, if any, 
whether they wished to be represented by a union in negotiations with their 
employer, and whether it should be the union(s) making the référence. The 
full set of published Section 12 ballots were examined with a view to extrac-
ting a full set of data from the ballots of workers; the resuit was a set of 249 
observations for the récognition claims of an individual union from a total 
of 228 published reports. In this set of 249 observations there were 38 dif-
férent unions involved, with the major ones being the Transport and 
General Workers Union with 21.3 per cent, the Association of Scientific, 
Technical and Managerial Staffs (20.5 per cent), the Amalgamated Union 
of Engineering Workers (Technical, Administrative and Supervisory Sec-
tion) (11.6 per cent) and the Association of Professional, Executive Clérical 
and Computer Staff (6.8 per cent). More than half of the cases (56.2 per 
cent) involved non-manual workers only, 35.3 per cent involved manual 
workers only, and 8.4 per cent involved both manual and non-manual 
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workers. A quite sizeable range of industries was represented in the set, but 
with the largest individual groups being the Distributive Trades (12.9 per 
cent), Mechanical engineering (9.6 per cent), Food, drink and tobacco 
manufacturing and Professional and Scientific services (both 7.6 per cent), 
Chemicals and allied industries (6.8 per cent) and Miscellaneous services 
(6.4 per cent). The basic results of the ballots were an ACAS recommenda-
tion in favour of full récognition in 59.8 per cent of cases, a recommenda-
tion for partial30 récognition in 4.0 per cent, and with récognition being not 
recommended in the remaining 36.1 per cent of cases. 
In the remainder of this section we consider the influence of certain 
specified unit characteristics on the likelihood of receiving a recommenda-
tion for récognition from ACAS. This type of analysis has been undertaken 
on the outcomes of union représentation élections31 and more recently on 
union decertification outcomes32 in the United States. The unit 
characteristics hypothesised to influence the likelihood of receiving a 
recommendation for récognition are argued to operate through the level of 
employée support expressed for the union bringing the claim. This does not 
seem an unreasonable operating assumption in view of our basic figures 
which indicate a mean level of employée support of 63.2 per cent (standard 
déviation = 19.1) in claims where récognition was recommended, com-
pared to a mean figure of only 34.6 per cent (standard déviation 20.2) in 
claims where récognition was not recommended. 
The basic framework of analysis employed hère builds on the argument 
of Farber and Saks33 that, at the level of the individual employée, if the ex-
pected utility from the job becoming a union job is higher than from it not 
becoming a union job, then the individual will vote for the union. If we ag-
gregate up from the individual employée to the bargaining unit level of 
analysis, then this utility based choice or décision will be made under the 
combined influence of union and employer arguments and pressures so that 
our potential explanatory variables can be grouped under three basic sub-
30 A partial récognition recommendat ion may, for example, hâve involved a recommen-
dation that the union be recognised only for matters at the discrétion of the local plant manage-
ment. See P.B. BEAUMONT, A.W.J. THOMSON and M.B. GREGORY, Bargaining Struc-
tures, Management Décision, Vol. 18, No. 3, 1980, pp. 150-51. 
31 See, for example, Joseph B. ROSE, «What Factors Influence Union Représentation 
Elections?», Monthly Labor Review, Vol. XCV, 1972, pp. 49-51. 
32 See, for example, John C. A N D E R S O N , Gloria BUSMAN and Charles O ' R E I L L Y , 
«What Factors Influence the Outcome of Decertification Elections?», Monthly Labor Review, 
Vol. Ci l , November 1979. 
33 Henry S. FARBER and Daniel H . SAKS, «Why Workers Want Unions: The Rôle of 
Relative Wages and Job Characterist ics», Journal of Political Economy, Vol. 88, No. 2, April 
1980, pp. 351-4. 
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headings: (i) the attractiveness of the individual union seeking récognition; 
(ii) the attractiveness of unionism and collective bargaining coverage in 
gênerai; and (iii) the extent and nature of employer opposition to récogni-
tion in gênerai, or to the particular union seeking récognition. 
Our first sub-vector of variables must take account of the argument 
that the supply of union organising services will vary in direct proportion to 
the incentives on individual union leaders to expand their organisations34. 
The implication of this argument is that there is likely to be a wide variation 
in the amount of resources that individual unions are willing to allocate to 
recruitment and organising activities. It has already been noted that a 
disproportionate number (60.2 per cent) of our Section 12 cases involved 
only four unions. This we assume is reasonably représentative of the extent 
of their involvement across the full range of recruitment and organising ac-
tivity. Accordingly, we expect a higher level of worker support, and thus a 
greater probability of a récognition recommendation, in cases involving 
thèse four unions on the grounds that they are the most committed to ex-
panding their organisations and hâve therefore devoted relatively more at-
tention and effort to the task of persuading workers to vote for them. The 
basic figures indicate that thèse four unions received a recommendation for 
récognition in 64.9 per cent of their claims, which may be compared to the 
53.5 per cent 'success rate' of the other unions. 
A second potentially relevant variable under this sub-heading is sug-
gested by Berkowitz's comment that: 
... the function of organising ... is a selling job designed to convince workers of the 
wisdom of attaching themselves to unionism in gênerai and to one union in par-
ticular. If competing unions are in the field, the task becomes at once easier and 
more difficult. The rivais might, quite unconsciously, aid each other since both are 
interested in overcoming opposition to rhe idea of unionism; yet their tasks are more 
difficult since each is attempting to sell its own differentiated brand of the product.35 
The essence of this argument is that the présence of union compétition in 
récognition claims is a double-edged weapon from any one union's point of 
view in that it is likely to raise the proportion of respondents in favour of 
collective bargaining coverage in gênerai, but lower the proportion of 
respondents in favour of any one union. It is the latter proposition that we 
are concerned with hère as the issue of inter-union compétition was one of 
the major difficulties that ACAS claimed to hâve faced in operating the 
statutory récognition provisions36. In an attempt to measure, or at least pro-
34 See, for example, Monroe BERKOWITZ, «The Economies of Trade Union Organisa-
tion and Administration», Industrial and Labor Relations Review, Vol. 7, No. 4, July 1954. 
35 B E R K O W I T Z , op. cit., p p . 580-1 . 
36 ACAS Annual Report, 1980, p p . 73-76. 
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xy, the intensity of this inter-union compétition, we took the différence bet-
ween the percentage of respondents in favour of collective bargaining in 
gênerai and the percentage of respondents voting in favour of représenta-
tion by the particular union bringing the claim. The hypothesis hère was 
that the greater this différence (i.e. the more voted has gone to other unions) 
then the more intense was the inter-union compétition and hence the less the 
likelihood that the union bringing the claim would receive a recommenda-
tion for récognition. The basic figures certainly supported this proposition, 
with the différence being 4.9 per cent in cases where récognition was recom-
mended, and 7.5 per cent in those claims where récognition was not recom-
mended. 
The final variable under this particular sub-vector is the size of the 
workgroup involved in the claim. The expectation hère is that récognition is 
more likely to be achieved in the case of smaller sized Workgroups37. The a 
priori basis for expecting such a relationship is that the job related interests 
of workers in such units are likely to be more homogeneous in nature, which 
makes the unions 'selling job' somewhat easier — i.e. the union concerned 
will appear a much more attractive proposition to any individual employée 
if he is reasonably confident that most of the other employées in the unit 
want essentially the same thing from the union. Certainly our basic figures 
supported this hypothesized relationship; the mean unit size was 256.7 
employées in claims where récognition was recommended, compared to 
566.1 in claims where récognition was not recommended. 
In view of the extensive body of literature on the alleged différences in 
the gênerai attitudes of manual and non-manual workers towards the in-
stitution of trade unionism it was important to investigate the influence of 
this particular factor. The essence of the argument about the alleged dif-
férences in attitudes is that non-manual workers who join unions are assum-
ed to be motivated primarily by instrumental considérations which are suffi-
ciently strong to outweigh their principled objections to unionism, whereas 
manual workers are assumed to be motivated primarily by a principle com-
mitment to unionism38. This perspective would seem to imply that there 
should be lesser support for collective bargaining in gênerai among non-
manual workers. There was in fact little support for this particular proposi-
tion with the mean number of non-manual respondents wishing collective 
bargaining coverage in gênerai being 61.8 per cent, compared to 59.7 per 
cent of the manual worker respondents. However, as only 53.2 per cent of 
37 See the findings and discussion in Gary M. CHAISON, «Unit Size and Union Success 
in Représentation Elections», Monthly Labor Review, Vol. XCVI, February 1973, pp. 51-2. 
38 For a summary and critique see George SAYERS BAIN, David COATES, and Valérie 
ELLIS, Social Stratification and Trade Unionism, Heinemann, London, 1973, pp. 126-36. 
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claims involving non-manual workers only received a recommendation for 
récognition, compared to 72.7 per cent of claims for manual workers only, 
it is essential to control for this variable in our estimating équations. Under 
this second sub-vector of influence we also entered as a variable the percen-
tage of eligible voters in the unit who did in fact vote. This 'turn-out' 
variable was hypothesized to hâve a positive influence on the likelihood of 
receiving a recommendation for récognition, in that the higher the turnout 
the greater the interest in unionisation and collective agreement coverage in 
gênerai. The basic figures, however, provided no obvious support for this 
particular hypothesis; the mean turnout rate in claims where recommenda-
tion was recommended was 83.2 per cent and 84.1 per cent in cases where it 
was not recommended. 
Ideally, we would like a measure of the extent of employer opposition 
to récognition in gênerai, or to the particular union involved in bringing the 
claim. In the absence of such a direct measure we computed the length of 
time between the date of notification of the récognition claim to ACAS and 
the date of the published Section 12 report. The mean length of time involv-
ed was 14.3 months (standard déviation = 7.4), with our hypothesis being 
that the greater the length of time taken to hear the claim, the lower the 
likelihood of a recommendation for récognition. This time factor we argue 
is a reasonable proxy for the extent of employer opposition to union 
récognition, although we recognise that other factors may also operate to 
lengthen the time period involved in hearing and reaching a décision on a 
claim39. 
It is especially important to explicity test for this length of time in-
fluence as earlier expérience in Britain,40 as well as expérience in the United 
States,41 has indicated considérable union concern over the likelihood that 
the longer the time taken to hear a claim, the lower the probability of them 
receiving a récognition recommendation. Our basic figures were certainly 
consistent with this contention in that the mean length of time from referral 
to report was 13.1 months in the cases where récognition was recommend-
ed, compared to 16.5 months in the cases where récognition was not recom-
mended. 
Finally, in considering the industries in which the récognition claims 
occurred we differentiated the four industries where existing collective 
39 See, for example, ACAS Annual Report, 1978, p. 29. 
40 J A M E S , ibid., pp . 38-40. 
41 See, for example, Richard PROSTEN, «The Longest Season: Union Organising in the 
Last Décade», Proceedings of the Industrial Relations Research Association, Winter 1978, pp. 
240-49. 
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agreement coverage for the maie non-manual workforce was below 30 per-
cent (SICs V, XII, XV, XVII) from the rest. In the case of thèse particular 
industry orders one could argue that employer opposition will be greatest in 
them because of the lack of a tradition of widespread organisation — i.e. 
employers in such industries are less likely to feel the 'odd man ont' in op-
posing récognition claims, and may genuinely believe, on the basis of 
historical expérience, that union organisation is not appropriate to the cir-
cumstances of their industry. On the other hand, one might want to argue 
that the real source and strength of employer opposition to current récogni-
tion lies in the relatively few unorganised establishments in the relatively 
highly organised industries. This is because it is thèse establishments that 
hâve held out for so long against unionr in the face of a strong, surrounding 
tradition of workforce organisation. Thèse two potentially offsetting 
hypothèses make an a priori prédiction about the sign on the industry 
variable difficult. However, the basic figures indicated that 78.4 percent of 
the claims in thèse low organised industries received a récognition recom-
mendation compared to only a 57.3 percent success rate in the remaining in-
dustries. 
This complètes our set of potential explanatory variables and in Table 3 
we set out our basic corrélation results. The signs on ail the variables were as 
expected, with five of the seven attaining various degrees of statistical 
significance. The two most highly significant variables were the différence 
between the vote for collective bargaining coverage in gênerai and that for 
the individual union bringing the claim (a proxy for the intensity of inter-
union compétition) and the length of time from referral to report (a proxy 
for the extent of employer opposition). Thèse were followed by non-manual 
status, the claims of the unions most heavily involved in the Section 12 
claims (i.e. the particular union) and unit size, with ail relationships being in 
the predicted direction. A séries of stepwise multiple régression équations 
were then estimated,42 with the best fit équation being defined in terms of 
the step at which the prédictive power of the équation was maximised (using 
the adjusted R2). In this best fit équation only inter-union compétition and 
the particular union variables were statistically significant, but too much 
should not be made of the significance (or not) of any individual variable 
because of the extensive pattern of multi-collinearity that was présent 
42 It is acknowledged that the use of ordinary least squares to estimate an équation con-
taining a dichotomous dépendent variable may give rise to certain statistical biases. 
Theoretically more sound techniques (e.g. logit or probit analysis) do exist, but various studies 
employing both thèse and ordinary least squares hâve in practice found little différence bet-
ween the two sets of results. See, for example, Morley GUNDERSON, «Rétention of Trainees: 
A Study with a Dichotomous Dépendent Variable», Journal of Econometrics, Vol. 2, No. 2, 
April 1974. 
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among virtually ail the variables that were significant in Table 3. The fact of 
the matter is that there were strong interdependent relationships between 
non-manual status, inter-union compétition, unit size and the length of time 
involved in reaching a décision on the claim. This pattern of in-
terdependence is illustrated by the following mean statistics for the measure 
of inter-union compétition, unit size and the time involved for both manual 
and non-manual claims separately. 
TABLE 3 
Pearson Corrélation Coefficients between Independent 
Variables and an ACAS Recommendation for Récognition 
Variables Corrélation C 
Particular union + 0.14515** 
Inter-union compétition - 0.29131*** 
Unit size - 0.12433* 
Non-manual - 0.17302** 
Turnout rate + 0.01765 
Time involved - 0.21793*** 
Industry + 0.08614 
"significant at the .10 level 
'significant at the .05 îevel 
'significant at the .01 level 
TABLE 4 
Measure of Inter-Union Compétition 
(1) Unit size 
(2) Time involved 
(3) Inter-union 
compétition 
(1) 
Nom-manual 
claims 
538.7 (médian =100.5) 
16.6 
12.6 
(2) 
Manual claims 
86.2 (médian = 35.5) 
11.3 
3.2 
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Thèse basic figures clearly indicate that the non-manual récognition claims 
were overwhelmingly characterised by intense inter-union compétition, 
large unit size and took a relatively long period of time to be heard and 
decided. Thèse are ail factors that strongly militate against a union achiev-
ing récognition and thus go a long way towards explaining why only 53.2 
per cent of claims involving non-manual workers only received a recom-
mendation for récognition, compared to 72.7 per cent of claims for manual 
workers only. Thèse results, therefore, clearly provide little support for any 
notion that the unions realised the potential advantages of statutory 
récognition provisions by disproportionately winning recommendations for 
récognition in the key, under-organised sector of the labour market — i.e. 
the growing, white collar sector of employment. As a conséquence, it would 
appear that condition (ii) for union success under such provisions was not in 
fact fulfilled. 
In the next section we consider the fulfillment (or not) of the third and 
final condition. The non-fulfillment of condition (ii) would at first glance 
seem to make this something of a non-starter as a question. This is certainly 
true in relation to the non-manual claims (the first group of hard to organise 
employers), although we would argue that the union movement could still 
obviously gain in relation to the second group of hard to organise employers 
— i.e. the relatively few unorganised plants situated in industries with 
relatively high levels of manual worker organisation. 
THE EXTENT OF EMPLOYER COMPLIANCE 
WITH A RECOMMENDATION 
The issuance of a third party recommendation for récognition is far 
from constituting an automatic guarantee that such récognition will in fact 
corne about. According to Philip Ross43 such a recommendation is unlikely 
to ensure the establishment of collective bargaining arrangements for a 
union with a precarious employée majority in favour of it, or for one which 
faces persistent employer opposition. This perspective leads him to suggest 
that whether a contract is signed following an order to bargain is an impor-
tant test of the effectiveness of the National Labor Relations Board. On this 
question, Richard Prosten recently reported some figures which indicated 
that approximately 35 per cent of units were not under contract five years 
after représentation élections had been won by unions in the year 197044. In 
43 Philip ROSS, The Government as a Source of Union Power, Brown University Press, 
Providence, Rhode Island, 1965, pp . 258-9. 
44 P R O S T E R , op. cit., pp . 246-7. 
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Prosten's view récognition recommendations which did not actually resuit 
in the establishment of collective bargaining arrangements were relatively 
easy to predict on the basis of employer behaviour during the course of the 
hearing and décision making process. This behaviour being reflected in the 
relatively long period of time taken to hear and reach a décision on thèse 
récognition claims. 
In Britain the importance of examining this particular hypothesis, and 
indeed the whole question of the extent of employer compliance with 
recommendations for récognition, is suggested by the finding that not ail of 
the earlier Commission on Industrial Relations recommendations for 
récognition, during the period of opération of the Industrial Relations Act 
1971, were in fact implemented45. This resuit was alleged to be reasonably 
predictable in view of the relatively weak sanction for employer non-
compliance with a recommendation for récognition under the 1971 Act, 
namely an arbitration award requiring the employer to incorporate terms 
and conditions into his employées individual contracts of employment. And 
the important point to make hère is that this was exactly the same sanction, 
which was provided in Sections 15 and 16 of the Employment Protection 
Act 1975, for employer non-compliance that was operative during our 
period of study46. 
The extent of compliance with a recommendation for récognition dur-
ing our period of study was in fact systematically investigated by the in-
dependent study group Incomes Data Services who followed up on ail but 
five of the published Section 12 reports. This follow-up approach involved 
extensive sets of téléphone inquiries of the unions involved in the respective 
cases, with some occasional cross-checking with the employers concerned. 
Thèse inquiries were always made more than two months after the Section 
12 report was issued and typically were conducted some six months after it 
had been issued. In view of the fact that a recommendation for récognition 
should normally hâve become operative a fortnight after the employer 
received his copy of the final report, and the union could complain to 
ACAS of non-compliance when two months had elapsed from this 
operative date, thèse follow up investigations had clearly allowed sufficient 
time for a reasonably clear eut picture of the post award situation to 
émerge. That is, they certainly did not over-estimate the extent of employer 
opposition to récognition as reflected in non compliance with recommenda-
tions; if anything, their bias is in the other direction. The basic findings by 
Incomes Data Services were as follows:— 
45 JAMES, Loc. cit. 
46 J A M E S , ibid., p . 39. 
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Post Recommendation Position Total Number 
of Cases 
No Agreement (i.e. Due to non-compliance 
by employer) 88 
No Agreement Due to other circumstances 
(e.g. plant closure) 10 
Negotiations being conducted 30 
Partial Agreement 5 
Full Agreement 24 
No Recommendation for Récognition 88 
No Information (i.e. no foliow up) 5 
The above figures indicate that only in 17.9 percent of the reports recom-
mending récognition had this clearly corne about. Furthermore, there was 
definite non-compliance with the récognition recommendations in 54.3 per-
cent of the cases, a figure that was quite likely to be raised by some of the 
'Negotiations being conducted' category coming to nothing. It would ob-
viously be most useful, from the public policy point of view, to be able to 
predict with a reasonable degree of accuracy the type or character of claims 
where such non-compliance was most likely to occur. 
In an attempt to provide some perspective on the character of thèse 
definite non-compliance cases we estimated a séries of stepwise multiple 
régression équations on definite non-compliance using as a vector of poten-
tial explanatory variables the same set of bargaining unit characteristics that 
was utilised in the previous section. The best fit équation (defined in terms 
of the step which maximised the R2) indicated that the two significant 
variables were non-manual status and inter-union compétition both of 
which were negatively signed, thus indicating that definite non-compliance 
was significantly concentrated among recommendations for récognition 
which covered manual workers only and involved relatively little inter-
union compétition. That is, definite non-compliance tended to be concen-
trated in situations where a single, manual union had sought and received a 
récognition recommendation for a relatively small sized group of 
employées. 
CONCLUSIONS 
The above findings, when put together with those of the previous sec-
tion, reveal that (i) a significantly high proportion of non-manual claims 
never received a recommendation for récognition, and (ii) a significantly 
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high proportion of manual worker claims that received a recommendation 
for récognition were not in fact complied with by the employer. As we 
argued in an earlier section, the hard to organise groups of workers in Bri-
tain are disproportionately concentrated in the industries with significantly 
low levels of white collar organisation and in the relatively few unorganised 
establishments in the highly organised (manual worker) industries. It is 
thèse two diverse groups of hard to organise employers that appear to hâve 
effectively 'defeated' union récognition claims at two différent stages and 
thus prevented the réalisation of conditions (ii) and (iii) that we outlined in 
an earlier section. As a conséquence of this opposition the unions appear to 
hâve fallen well short of realising the potential advantages of statutory 
récognition provisions during this period of time in Britain. The major pro-
blème which we hâve documented hère were (i) the procédural delays in 
hearing and reporting on références, due particularly to employer opposi-
tion to récognition, and (ii) the relative ineffectiveness of sanctions for 
employer non-compliance with recommendations for récognition. Thèse 
particular problems hâve been highlighted in a récent review of the opéra-
tion of statutory récognition provisions in the United States47. This suggests 
that thèse particular sources of difficulty transcend the institutional détails 
of any one country's récognition procédures and are common to the opéra-
tion of statutory récognition provisions elsewhere. However, whether thèse 
common problems are in fact inhérent problems is the real crux of the mat-
ter. This is a question that is impossible to answer given the présent state of 
our knowledge, but is one that is likely to be much discussed in Britain, as 
well as elsewhere, in the years to corne. 
Les stipulations en matière de reconnaissance 
légale en Grande-Bretagne: 1976-80 
En Grande-Bretagne, les syndicats s'en sont traditionnellement remis à la recon-
naissance volontaire des employeurs. Toutefois, certains changements importants 
dans le système britannique de relations professionnelles à partir de la fin de la 
décennie 1960 a favorisé la mise en place d'un régime de reconnaissance légale de cer-
tains syndicats de cols blancs. Ces modifications avaient pour but de favoriser un 
glissement vers l'établissement de négociations avec les employeurs pris individuelle-
ment ainsi que le développement soutenu du syndicalisme dans le secteur des services 
et des emplois de bureau en général de beaucoup les moins fortement syndiqués au 
47 Moira HART, «Union Récognition in America - The Législative Snare», Industrial 
Law Journal, Vol. 7, 1978. 
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sein de la main-d'oeuvre britannique. Ces revendications syndicales ont été obtenues 
pendant la période dite du «contrat social», alors que le gouvernement travailliste en 
1974 cherchait à obtenir que le mouvement syndical restreigne ses revendications 
salariales en retour de certains avantages législatifs. Parmi ces avantages se trou-
vaient les sections 11 à 16 de la Loi sur la protection de l'emploi (Employment Pro-
tection Act) qui comprenaient les stipulations relatives à la reconnaissance des syndi-
cats. 
L'article évalue les gains syndicaux obtenus pendant la période où fut appliqué 
ce mécanisme législatif de reconnaissance syndicale, soit de février 1976 à août 1980. 
Fondé sur la notion du coût du recrutement syndical, l'article analyse trois condi-
tions auxquelles le mouvement syndical doit répondre pour bénéficier des avantages 
de ces stipulations. Ces conditions sont les suivantes: 
i. il doit y avoir une volonté significative de réclamer la reconnaissance dans les 
secteurs du marché du travail où le recrutement est difficile; 
ii. il doit y avoir un nombre significatif de requêtes qui ont donné lieu à une déci-
sion de reconnaissance dans ces secteurs où le recrutement est difficile; 
iii. il doit y avoir une intention significative d'acquiescement des employeurs à la 
reconnaissance syndicale dans ces secteurs. 
Les secteurs du marché du travail où le recrutement est difficile proviennent 
essentiellement des industries où le degré de syndicalisation des cols blancs est 
relativement bas et d'établissements non syndiqués peu nombreux dans des indus-
tries où la syndicalisation des travailleurs manuels est assez marqués. 
Bien que les syndicats aient obtenu certains gains, le plus souvent à la suite d'en-
tentes où la conciliation a été fructueuse, un examen des faits disponibles indique que 
la première condition s'est réalisée mais non les deux autres qui étaient plus difficiles. 
Les principaux problèmes que durent affronter les syndicats furent d'abord les délais 
tant dans l'audition que dans la décision des requêtes à cause de l'opposition des 
employeurs et, en second lieu, de l'inefficacité relative des sanctions contre la 
résistance des employeurs aux décisions rendues. Ces difficultés devront être sur-
montées si l'on veut dans l'avenir recourir aux stipulations relatives à la recon-
naissance syndicale en Grande-Bretagne. Ceci peut cependant s'avérer une tâche qui 
sera loin d'être facile quand l'on considère que ces difficultés semblent aussi exister 
dans d'autres pays, notamment aux États-Unis qui ont adopté depuis longtemps ces 
systèmes de reconnaissance légale des syndicats. 
